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Abstract
We investigate how economic integration in North America has altered the pattern of foreign
direct investment (FDI) to and from Canada. The theoretical analysis suggests that while the
Canadian-U.S. free trade agreement should generate less FDI, the addition of Mexico in the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) produces the opposite e¤ect. The fall in
trade costs results in investment diversion from the U.S. and Canada, yet lower xed costs may
increase FDI even in those countries via an increased incentive to locate production facilities
abroad rather than only domestically. Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator, we nd that
U.S. FDI in Canada as well as Canadian FDI in the U.S. have expanded disproportionately
since NAFTA, suggesting that the latter e¤ect dominates.
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1 Introduction
A salient feature of international economic relations is the recent proliferation of regional integration
schemes. The European Union (EU) has expanded its membership into Eastern Europe while at
the same time continuing its move towards deepintegration. Many developing countries in Asia
and South America have pursued economic integration amongst themselves (ASEAN, Mercosur)
or have sought free trade agreements with other developed countries or blocs, such as the EU or
the United States. In North America, the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA)
was followed quickly by the inclusion of Mexico into a North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). The latter had been unique at the time as it combined two advanced developed with a
developing country, a phenomenon dubbed the new regionalismby Ethier (1998).
This papers focus is on studying the e¤ect of NAFTA on Canadian inward and outward invest-
ment. Our main hypothesis is that the fall in trade costs results in investment diversion from the
U.S. and Canada, yet lower xed costs may increase FDI even in those countries via an increased
incentive to locate production facilities abroad rather than only domestically. Of primary interest
is investment in and from the partner countries, although the e¤ect on investment from countries
outside of the agreement is investigated as well.1 In doing so, we also need to take into consideration
that Canada had entered into CUSFTA only ve years prior to NAFTA. This implies that trade
as well as investment costs between Canada and the United States were lowered before these were
lowered in Mexico. Consequently, we analyze a two-step reduction in these costs in our theoretical
model and generate predictions for the di¤erential e¤ects these reductions have for Canadian FDI.
We use a three-country model based on Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006). The model
predicts that economic integration between the two Northern countries -with no decline in invest-
ment costs- results in decreased FDI due to a decline in the incentive for tari¤-jumping. When the
1We do not consider Mexicos outward FDI since it is negligible and data on early years are largely missing.
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Southern country is added -with not only a decline in trade costs but also declines in investment
costs-, FDI in the entire region by the member countries increases. First, medium productivity
Northern rms switch from using the other Northern country to using the South as an export
platform, especially in components production. Second, even though there is a decline in FDI
in Northern countries by low productivity rms due to lower trade costs, lower investment costs
make investing in these high cost countries attractive for medium and high productivity rms,
particularly in assembly. Since the level of production by low productivity rms is small due to
their ine¢ ciency, the negative diversion e¤ect is dominated by the positive FDI creation e¤ect and
investment in the region as a whole rises.
The empirical analysis uses aggregate FDI data from 1980 to 2002 and covers the largest feasible
sample of bilateral FDI. Unfortunately, we have no rm level information. Likewise, industry level
information that would at a minimum cover Mexico, Canada and the U.S. is not available on a
comparable basis for this time period. Still, we believe that how economic integration of this kind,
rst the traditional North-North, then the new North-South, a¤ects small Northern countries in the
aggregate is of interest to academics and policy makers alike and has not been studied su¢ ciently.
As far as the e¤ect of NAFTA on FDI is concerned, most existing studies either focus on Mexico
alone or the U.S. and Mexico, ignoring Canada.
We nd that since the start of economic integration in North America, Canadian FDI in the
U.S. and U.S. FDI in Canada has increased by more than what can be explained by the usual
determinants of FDI such as market size, factor cost di¤erences or exchange rates and relative
to the rise in FDI elsewhere. Due to the relatively short time period that only CUSFTA was in
e¤ect before the addition of Mexico, it is di¢ cult to separately identify the e¤ects of the di¤erent
stages of integration. Still, these results suggest that overall, the investment cost lowering e¤ect
of integration dominates the investment diverting one from lowering trade barriers and adding a
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low-cost country. There is some, albeit weak, evidence that Canadian FDI in Mexico has not been
positively a¤ected by NAFTA, despite an increase in the absolute amount of FDI that can be
observed after 1994.
We also nd robust evidence that the FDI-increasing e¤ect among Northern NAFTA countries
does not apply to non-NAFTA FDI in Canada, which is negatively a¤ected, suggesting a diversion
e¤ect for this type of FDI. Still, overall our results suggest that adding low-cost countries to existing
agreements among industrialized countries, such as the EUs eastward expansion, does not imply
reduced FDI in the original countries, not even the smaller ones, from partner countries. While
FDI in the new members is likely to increase, such a rise need not come at the expense of FDI in
existing members but rather, the total increase in FDI in the region benets all countries, at least
as far as intra-regional FDI is concerned.
We do emphasize that our results appear to be very robust. We carefully correct for both
country-pair specic autocorrelation as well as heteroscedasticity in our econometric analysis. We
use skill data drawn from the International Labor Organization (ILO) as, for example, Carr, Maskus
and Markusen (2001), but also the updated schooling data from Barro and Lee as, for example,
Blonigen, Davies and Head (2003). The results are also robust to the consideration of an announce-
ment e¤ectsince both CUSFTA and NAFTA were anticipated before their formal inception.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the previous research. The following
section discusses the theoretical implications of our three-country model on the location choice of
rms. The following section presents the empirical model which is designed to allow testing of the
main hypotheses generated by the theory. After a discussion of our econometric approach and the
data, the empirical results are presented, followed by concluding remarks.
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2 Previous Literature
The recent surge in regional integration e¤orts is unprecedented. In 2008 alone, 35 new regional
trade agreements (RTA) were notied to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is the largest
number of RTA notications in any single year since the establishment of the WTO. In total, there
are 422 RTAs notied of which 230 were in force in 2008.
The ever increasing web of integration schemes has important e¤ects on international economic
interactions. Traditionally, the analysis of such agreements -dating back to Viner (1950)- has
focused on their impact on trade ows as they potentially lead to both trade creation (between the
partners in the agreement) and trade diversion (from countries now outside of the agreement).2
Economic integration and its coincident reduction in trade barriers also alter the incentives
for rms when making their location decisions. Motta and Norman (1996), Neary (2002), Yeaple
(2003a), Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007) and Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006) have for-
mally examined the e¤ect of regional integration on multinational rmslocation decisions through
export-platform FDI. This type of FDI is usually taken to refer to a situation where the output of
a foreign a¢ liate is largely exported to a third country rather than sold in the host country. Di¤er-
ent from simple bilateral FDI models, export-platform FDI models include at least three countries
with complex integration strategies. Two countries form a trading bloc lowering the intra-bloc trade
costs. External trade barriers remain largely the same as before. One generic result of these models
is that intra-bloc trade liberalization encourages horizontal FDI in trading blocs since foreign rms
can use one of the member countries as an export-platform to serve the entire region.3
Trade agreements not only reduce trade, but also investment costs, which can be viewed as
2See Feenstra (2004) for a review of the early literature on RTAs.
3Motta and Norman (1996) theoretically show that economic integration may increase the incentive of rms from
countries outside of the agreement to locate in the lowest cost country inside the free trade area (FTA). But they
also show that rms from inside the FTA benet from the increased market size due to increased economies of scale.
Tekin-Koru and Waldkirch (2010) show that in the case of NAFTA the latter e¤ect dominates the former with respect
to foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico.
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essentially reducing the initial, xed cost of foreign investment. These lower costs in turn raise the
incentive for rms that may not have been engaged abroad before to consider foreign production
locations. Thus, it becomes an empirical question whether the foreign investment diversion or the
FDI creation e¤ect dominates for countries within an agreement that are not the low-cost location.
There are a number of empirical studies that examine the relationship between regional economic
integration and FDI. Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland (1995) and Barrel and Pain (1999) using the
EU data and Feinberg and Keane (2001) and Chen (2009) using US data support the existence
of a positive investment creation e¤ect of RTAs. Chen (2009) nds this e¤ect to vary sharply
with the size of the integrated markets and countriescomparative advantage. Similarly, but using
European data and spatial econometric techniques, Baltagi, Egger and Pfa¤ermayr (2008) point to
a relocation of FDI from Western European to Eastern European host countries. This is consistent
with export-platform FDI, where multinationals locate subsidiaries in host markets with low costs
of production to serve broad consumer bases elsewhere.
Ozden and Parodi (2004) for Mercosur, Yeyati, Stein, and Daude (2004) for a large sample of
countries and Park and Park (2008) for East Asia nd strong investment creation and diversion
e¤ects of RTAs. Yeyati et.al (2004) claim that FDI into RTA member countries is more attractive
than FDI into nonmember countries. Park and Park (2008) supply evidence for both North-North
and North-South RTAs being preferred to South-South RTAs in East Asia.
As far as the e¤ect of NAFTA on FDI is concerned, most existing studies either focus on
Mexico alone, such as Waldkirch (2003) or Cuevas, Messmacher and Werner (2005), or the U.S. and
Mexico, ignoring Canada, such as our companion paper (Tekin-Koru and Waldkirch, 2010). Hejazi
and Pauly (2005) examine the e¤ect of NAFTA on Canada, although they use a simple gravity
framework and analyze U.S. outward FDI and OECD bilateral inward FDI separately, making their
results not strictly comparable to ours, as we discuss in more detail below. Blomström and Kokko
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(1997) report that CUSFTA led to a reduction in within-region FDI to both Canada and the US
while it increased out-of-region FDI into Canada. Similarly, they nd that NAFTA and Mercosur
increased the out-of-region FDI into Mexico and other member countries, respectively.
In this paper we present a well founded theoretical discussion followed by a straightforward yet
thorough empirical design. The paper contributes to the above literature in at least three ways:
First, our data covers the largest feasible sample of bilateral FDI which is important for complete-
ness. Second, unlike most papers we have a complete account of North American integration by
including both CUSFTA and NAFTA in our theoretical and empirical analyses. Last but not least,
our results show that the investment creation e¤ect dominates the investment diversion e¤ect and
therefore adding low cost countries into an already existing agreement does not necessarily reduce
FDI in the original members, not even in the small ones.
3 The Theoretical Model and Hypotheses
In this section we present a variation of the three-country model of Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl
(2006) -from now on GHS. They examine the location strategies of heterogeneous multinational
rms in a three-country setting and do not consider economic integration e¤ects, so we extend and
re-interpret their model for our case.
Economic integration will a¤ect both trade (tari¤and transportation) costs and the xed costs of
establishing operations abroad. The former is a standard feature of trade agreements and formalized
in specic reductions of both tari¤s and non-tari¤ barriers. The latter may result as a consequence
of loosening regulations governing foreign investment as described in the previous section. Thus,
we model both, which generates interesting hypotheses regarding the FDI e¤ects of CUSFTA and
NAFTA with respect to the location decisions of U.S. and Canadian rms.
In this model, rms choose between domestic production and undertaking foreign direct in-
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vestment to save either production or trading costs. Assembly activities, which result in nished
products, and intermediate activities, which result in inputs used in assembly, are di¤erentiated.
Consumption. Households consume J + 1 products produced by J di¤erentiated goods sectors
and one homogeneous good sector. Consumers share identical preferences which can be represented
as
U = x0 +
JX
j=1
1
j
j
j
X
j
j ; 0 < j < 1 (1)
where x0 is the consumption of the homogeneous good and X
j
j is an index of consumption
of the di¤erentiated goods produced by industry j 2 f1; :::Jg: This index is a CES aggregate of
amounts of di¤erent varieties consumed.4
Markets. There are three markets: Canada (C), the U.S. (U) and Mexico (M). Firms in the
Northern countries are more productive than those in the Southern country in the homogeneous
good production. Therefore, Northern country wages are higher than the Southern country ones.
Formally, wC = wU = 1 > wM = w; where w` is the wage rate in country `: The homogeneous
good is produced in all three countries in equilibrium and taken to be the numeraire. The sizes of
these markets for the di¤erentiated products are di¤erent. Let M ` be the number of households in
country ` that consume di¤erentiated products. We assume that MC = MM < MU : We further
assume that producers of di¤erentiated goods are from the Northern countries and they must locate
their headquarter activities at home, following Tekin-Koru and Waldkirch (2010). Di¤erent from
them we allow for a market in Mexico for the goods produced by multinationals.
Demand. The demand in market ` is given by
x` =  =(1 )M `(X`)( )=(1 )(p`) 1=(1 ) (2)
4Xj =
24njZ
0
xj(i)
jdi
35xj(i) ; where 0 < j < 1; xj(i) is the consumption of the ith variety of industry j and nj is
the number of varieties in that industry. Given equation (1), the elasticity of substitution within j is 1=1   j : We
assume that j > j ; in other words, there is a higher degree of substitution within industry than among industries.
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where X` is an aggregate consumption index for varieties in the industry in country `; and p`
is the price charged in country `.
Production. Productivity levels in industry j are independent draws from the cumulative dis-
tribution function Gj(). A rms production function in industry j is Fj(m;a), where m is the
intermediate goods -or components- used in the production of the nal good and a is the level of
assembly activity. Fj() is an increasing and concave function with constant returns to scale. The
elasticity of substitution between the intermediate goods production m and the assembly activity
a is less than 1.
Production Costs. Let cj(pm; pa) be the unit cost function dual to Fj(m;a), where pm and pa
are the e¤ective prices (inclusive of delivery costs) of intermediate goods and assembly activity,
respectively. Thus, cj(pm; pa)= is the per-unit variable cost of production for a rm with pro-
ductivity . A rm that chooses to produce intermediate goods in a di¤erent location from its
headquarters bears a xed cost of gj units of home labor. On the other hand, if the assembly
activity is undertaken in a di¤erent place than the headquarters, the rm incurs a xed cost of fj
units of home labor. These xed costs are assumed to be independent of the foreign location. That
is, a U.S. rm does not bear a di¤erent xed cost when it chooses to produce its intermediates
(assembly activity) in Mexico rather than Canada. Since 1 unit of m requires 1 unit of local labor
in the place where intermediates are produced and 1 unit of a requires 1 unit of local labor in the
assembly location, Mexico enjoys a comparative advantage in the production of both components
and nal goods relative to the production of the homogeneous good.
Trade Costs. Iceberg trade costs could apply to both intermediate and nal goods. We will,
however, focus on costly nal goods trade only.5 A rm in industry j must ship tj  1 units of
the nal good to deliver one unit of that good to the nal consumption destination. A rm with
5See GHS for a brief treatment of costly intermediate goods trade.
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headquarters in C(U) will never produce the intermediates in U(C). Such a rm would instead
produce the intermediates in M , ship them costlessly to the assembly plant and thus achieve lower
variable costs while incurring the same xed costs. Moreover, there is no justication for a rm to
produce the intermediates in two locations due to the costless shipping of these goods. Therefore,
the production of intermediates will be realized either in C(U) or M but not both.
Given the full structure of the model, it is now easy to calculate the variable costs of a rm in
industry j that opts for di¤erent location strategies. For example, a Canadian rm with productivity
 that wants to deliver nal goods to consumers in the U.S. can produce and assemble the good in
Canada and pay tjcj(1; 1)= per unit, whereas it would pay tjcj(w;w)= per unit to conduct all its
operations in Mexico. Another possibility for this Canadian rm is to produce the components in
Mexico and perform the assembly in the U.S. and thus pay tjcj(w; 1)= per unit.
Operating Prots. For any strategy with a xed cost of k and unit variable cost of c= the
maximized operating prots are
 = (1  )Yc =(1 )   k (3)
where  = =(1 ) is a transformed measure of productivity and Y  M `(X`)( )=(1 ) is
the size of the entire regions demand. We shall assume that Y C = YM < Y U , i.e., the U.S. is
the large country among all three, and the share of Mexican or Canadian demand in the regions
demand is =2 = Y C=Y = YM=Y where  2 (0; 1): In the original model, GHS assume that two
high-cost, developed countries are of equal size and greater than the low-cost, developing country.
Here we assume that Mexico and Canada are of equal size and smaller than the U.S. This assumption
simplies the analysis without a¤ecting the major conclusions described below.6
6Canadian and Mexican GDP are not quite the same. In 2008, purchasing power adjusted GDP was $1.52 trillion
in Mexico and $1.21 trillion in Canada, according to the World Banks World Development Indicators. In other words,
Canada is a high cost country and it is smaller than Mexico. That actually strengthens our conclusions. The equal
country size assumption considerably simplies the algebra, gets rid of one parameter and gives us clean results. All
we need indeed is that the size of the US should be greater than 1/3 of the size of the region (Canada+US+Mexico),
which is a fact.
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3.1 Pre-CUSFTA
We begin our analysis with a regime of relatively high trade costs (inclusive of tari¤ and transporta-
tion costs) and high xed costs of FDI among all three countries, which is a good approximation
of the time before CUSFTA.7 Globerman and Shapiro (1999) provide a nice overview of foreign
investment policies in Canada for this period.
We concentrate on rms in a particular industry j; and to reduce the clutter in the notation we
drop the subscript j from now on. We assume that
tH >
c(w; 1)
c(w;w)
(4)
where tH denotes a high level of trade costs. We will use superscript H(L) to denote the
high(low) level of a variable from now on. When trade costs are this high, the lowest cost of serving
any market is assembling the nal product in the consumption location to conserve the shipping
costs including tari¤s. To see this, notice that if intermediates are produced in M and assembled
in C(U), the unit variable cost of serving C(U) is at most c(w; 1). However, the unit variable cost
of serving the same market from a plant in M is at least tc(w;w) which is obviously higher given
inequality (2).
Next, observe that if the intermediates are produced in C(U), the cost of serving C(U) from an
assembly plant there is at most c(1; 1), whereas serving C(U) from an assembly plant in U(C) is
at least tc(1; 1) and from an assembly plant in M is at least tc(1; w). As long as c(w; 1)=c(w;w) >
c(1; 1)=c(1; w)8, inequality (2) also satises tc(1; w) > c(1; 1). Therefore, each market is served at
the lowest cost through assembly in the same market. No rm will choose to assemble in one foreign
location only and export to both home and the other country. In other words, export platform FDI
as analyzed in Ekholm et al. (2007) is not a possibility in this high trade cost regime.
7This is a case we use as our benchmark and corresponds to the high trade costs scenario of GHS.
8c(w; 1)=c(w;w) > c(1; 1)=c(1; w) holds if and only if log c(pm; pa) is submodular. When the elasticity of substitu-
tion between m and a is less than one, as we have assumed, the submodularity is guaranteed.
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This leaves us with a total of eight potential location strategies: home or Mexican production
of intermediate goods with assembly either in home, or in home and in Mexico, or in home and in
the other Northern country or in all three countries.
Next, we compare the operating prots under these alternative strategies. Since we assume
asymmetry between the two Northern countries, di¤erent from GHS we have to consider two sub-
cases within each regime; one for Canada and one for the U.S. as the source of FDI. The maximum
attainable prots for all dominant strategies in each regime for each rm are given in Table 1.
The set of possible location strategies when a C rm invests involves six elements: fC;Cg;
fC;UCg; fC;UCMg; fM;Cg; fM;UCg; and fM;UCMg. The rst element in brackets is the
location of components production and the second one is (are) the location(s) of assembly. Notice
that no C rm will use M as an export platform to U in this high trade cost regime since that
strategy is dominated by assembling in C and U as long as the size of market U in the region is
greater than 1=3.
The left panel of Figure 1 shows the combinations of xed costs of FDI in components, g and
productivity levels,  that give rise to di¤erent optimal location strategies for a Canadian rm in
the pre-CUSFTA regime. The lines in the gure represent the boundaries between regions with
di¤erent optimal location strategies. In the region fM;Cg; for example, components are produced
in M and shipped costlessly to C for assembly. The nal product is consumed locally and also
exported to M and U . The gure is drawn for a particular value of xed costs of FDI in assembly,
f . When f changes, the boundaries between the regions shift.9 FDI in assembly takes place to the
right of the dashed lines in the gure.
For all positive values of g, rms with low productivity conduct all their production activities
9We followed the details provided in the appendix of GHS in the construction of these boundaries. The idea is
simple. The boundary between fM;Cg and fM;UCg, for example, is dened by the values that g takes for each 
value when M;C = M;UC . In this particular case, the boundary is vertical because both strategies involve FDI in
components and thus the boundary does not depend on g. Detailed calculations of our boundaries and their shifts in
di¤erent regimes are available upon request.
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at home and export the nal product to the U.S. and Mexico. The level of output produced by
these rms is relatively small because the variable cost savings through FDI do not compensate
for the high xed costs of FDI. Firms with intermediate levels of productivity may engage in
FDI in components or in assembly depending upon the size of g. They will engage in intra-rm
trade besides exporting nal output from Canada or from an export platform in the U.S. Notice
that high trade costs and the bigger size of the U.S. market encourage rms to undertake FDI in
assembly there rather than the low cost but small Mexico. Firms with high productivity levels
go for complete globalization in which they set up assembly plants in all three countries and thus
engage in horizontal FDI in all three countries.
The set of possible location strategies when the investing rm is from U involves six elements:
fU;Ug; fU;UMg; fU;UCMg; fM;Ug; fM;UMg; and fM;UCMg. Observe that, di¤erent from
the previous case, no U rm will use C as an export platform toM sinceM is the low cost location
with the same size market as C and the same level of FDI xed costs.
The right panel of Figure 1 depicts the di¤erent possible location strategies when the investing
rm is from the U.S. The intersection points of the boundaries in the U.S. case are drawn exactly
the same as the Canadian case for convenience. The productivity levels corresponding to the inter-
section points can be di¤erent from the Canadian case, although the ordering of these productivity
levels and thus the intuition are not. This is true for all three regimes discussed in this paper.
As in the case of a Canadian rm, the low productivity rms prefer not to engage in FDI in
assembly and high productivity rms conduct horizontal FDI in all markets. Firms with interme-
diate productivity levels originating from the U.S., on the other hand, have their assembly line set
up in Mexico rather than Canada.
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3.2 CUSFTA
In this subsection we concentrate on the case where trade costs between only the two Northern
countries are reduced, reecting the drop in tari¤ barriers between Canada and the U.S., while
those barriers between Mexico and the two Northern countries remain high.10 We also assume no
decline in the xed costs of investing in this regime. In particular,
c(1; 1)
c(1; w)
< tL <
c(w; 1)
c(w;w)
(5)
tH >
c(w; 1)
c(w;w)
(6)
where tL is the reduced trade costs between C and U and tH is the high trade costs between
M and the other two countries.11 We assume that the relative decline in trade costs are bounded
both from below and above to ensure a moderate level of decline.12
In this scenario there are again six location strategies to consider. The di¤erence between
the optimal location strategies in pre-CUSFTA and CUSFTA regimes for Canada and thus our
rst three testable hypotheses can be derived by comparing Figures 1 and 2. All hypotheses are
formulated with respect to aggregate FDI, even though the model is one of heterogeneous rms.
This is because we only have comparable economy-wide data for the three NAFTA countries as
well as FDI in and between all other countries which serve as our control group (for details, see the
next section).
Hypothesis 1 Canadian FDI in the U.S. declines after CUSFTA.
10While the Canada-U.S. FTA in 1989 relaxed some investment rules for investors in the partner country, it stopped
short of according national treatment for all investments. In particular, investments exceeding a certain threshold,
$CDN 150 million at the time, still required a review.
11 Inequality (5) corresponds to the moderate transport case of GHS. Since CUSFTA reduced tari¤ barriers but not
necessarily transportation costs, we opt for not using their low transport cost scenario.
12 In particular, C(1;1)
C(1;w)
< T
H
TL
< T
HTL(1 )+TL=2 TH(1 )
THTL=2
:
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Compare the left panels of Figures 1 and 2. High productivity Canadian rms continue to
produce and sell close to the customers and maintain their investments in the U.S. Low productivity
rms continue to produce at home and export to the other two countries as before but now they
are able to expand their production to export more to the U.S. due to the lower trade costs. Notice
that region fC;Cg increases in size. The medium productivity rms, on the other hand, behave
much more di¤erently. Observe that regions fC;UCg and fM;UCg shrink in size. Trade costs are
low enough for the rms at the lower end of the medium productivity range to invest in the home
country and export, rather than to invest in the assembly line in the U.S. Given the same level of
production costs in Canada and the U.S., now they are able to avoid xed costs of assembly in the
U.S. In other words, the need for tari¤-jumping FDI declines after CUSFTA.
Hypothesis 2 Canadian FDI in Mexico declines after CUSFTA.
High productivity Canadian rms continue to produce and sell close to the customers and main-
tain their investments in Mexico. Observe that FDI in components in Mexico by low and medium
level productivity Canadian rms decline after CUSFTA. Due to lower trade costs, Canadian rms
are less able to justify the xed costs of components production and thus reduce their FDI in
components in Mexico. That is why we observe a shrinkage in the size of the regions fM;Cg and
fM;UCg.
Hypothesis 3 U.S. FDI declines in Canada after CUSFTA.
Examine the right panels of Figures 1 and 2. The behavior of low and low-end medium produc-
tivity U.S. rms is very similar to the behavior of Canadian rms. They increase their production
of components and assembly in the home country and export to the entire region to benet from
low trade costs. Therefore, the size of region fU;Ug increases. The low-end medium productivity
rms reduce their assembly activity in Mexico once used to supply Canada and instead invest in
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the U.S. and export to Canada, while the rest of the medium productivity rms continue to use
Mexico as an export platform.
3.3 NAFTA
NAFTA, going into e¤ect in January of 1994, went much further than CUSFTA with respect to FDI
regulations. It contains a provision to grant national treatment to foreign investors from partner
countries. In addition, it codies the most favored nation principle in that signatory states must be
accorded at least the same favorable treatment as any other country. NAFTA does allow the use
of negative lists, the exclusion of certain sectors from liberalization. However, even this can be
argued to foster transparency as exceptions are made explicit and are not subject to an approval
process that may potentially deny any investment in any sector. In practice, the major exceptions
were nancial services and culture and media.13 Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that it took
until NAFTA for foreign investment regulations to be relaxed substantially enough for investment
costs to fall signicantly.14
In this subsection, we analyze changes in the optimal location strategies when trade costs
between all three countries are as low as indicated in inequality (5). Moreover, we also assume a
decline in the xed costs of both components production and assembly of the nal products as a
reasonable approximation of NAFTA. For a detailed discussion of NAFTAs investment provision,
see Graham and Wilkie (1994).
In the NAFTA regime there are only ve location strategies to consider. The set of possible
location strategies when a C rm invests are fC;Cg; fC;CMg; fC;UCMg; fM;Cg; and fM;Mg,
whereas for a U rm they are fU;Ug; fU;UMg; fU;UCMg; fM;Ug; and fM;Mg.15 The di¤erence
13For a detailed discussion of NAFTAs investment provision, see Graham and Wilkie (1994).
14For a dissenting view see Buckley, Clegg, Forsans and Reilly (2007) who argue that the fundamental policy
environment did not change since the 1989 treaty, although they do acknowledge a potential e¤ect on FDI stemming
from the expanded geographic area of NAFTA.
15fM;Mg dominates fM;UCg, fM;UMg and fM;UCMg under NAFTA.
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between the optimal location strategies in CUSFTA and NAFTA regimes and thus our remaining
testable hypotheses can be derived by comparing Figures 2 and 3 which are depicted for low trade
and xed costs.
Hypothesis 4 Canadian FDI in the U.S. increases after NAFTA.
Even though there is a decline in Canadian FDI in the U.S. by low-end medium productivity
rms due to declining trade costs, the decline in the xed costs of assembly, f , increases Canadian
FDI in the U.S. considerably by the remaining medium productivity and also high productivity
rms. Furthermore, if the decline in f is much more pronounced than the decline in g; then assembly
activity in all countries will go up. This can be shown as a huge downward shift of the positively
sloped boundary between fC;UCMg and fM;Mg. Thus, fC;UCMg may even become the only
optimal choice for all medium and high productivity rms.
Hypothesis 5 Canadian FDI in Mexico increases after NAFTA.
Examine the left panels of Figures 2 and 3. As the trade costs between Canada and Mexico
decrease, even low productivity rms start assembling in Mexico. Notice that region fC;UCg is
replaced by region fC;CM}, that is, medium productivity rms stop using the U.S. as an export
platform and start using Mexico as one. Some of the other medium productivity rms, on the other
hand, engage in full horizontal FDI in all countries, which was not a possibility before.
As g goes down, components production in Mexico by a majority of Canadian rms increases.
Observe that regions fM;UCg and fM;UCMg are replaced by region fM;Mg. When a Canadian
rm invests in performing any activity in low-cost Mexico, such FDI reduces its unit costs, which
raises the output level, and therefore increases the return to performing other production activities
in Mexico. Reduced trade costs coupled with low levels of xed costs in components make being
close to the nal consumers redundant. Notice that more rms with lesser productivity engage in
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FDI in assembly as well when g is low.
Hypothesis 6 U.S. FDI in Canada increases after NAFTA.
Compare the right panels of Figure 2 and 3. U.S. FDI in Canada compared to Canadian FDI
in the U.S. increases even more since there is no decline in U.S. FDI in Canada at all. Any decline
in the xed costs of assembly, f , increases U.S. FDI in Canada considerably by medium and high
productivity rms. As in the case of Canada, if the decline in f is more pronounced than the decline
in g, then fU;UCMg may become the only optimal choice for all medium and high productivity
U.S. rms.
4 The Empirical Model
Our empirical strategy is to examine the e¤ects of CUSFTA and NAFTA on inward and outward
Canadian FDI by employing a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator which attributes only changes
relative to a control group to the agreements. In addition, to avoid spurious correlations as much
as possible, we include an array of control variables drawn from the existing literature on the
determinants of foreign direct investment such as Brainard (1997), Markusen (1997, 2002), Carr et
al. (2001), Markusen and Maskus (2002) and Blonigen et al. (2003).
We rst outline the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation. Specically, let
FDIijt = +
2P
k=1
kdrk +
4P
l=1
ldhl +
2P
k=1
4P
l=1
kl (drk  dhl) (7)
where FDIijt is FDI in host country i from source country j at time t; rk denotes the regime
(k = 1 for CUSFTA, k = 2 for NAFTA) and hl denotes host-type, to be explained below. dr1 is a
dichotomous variable that is equal to one if the regime is CUSFTA (from 1989 on) and dr2 equals
one if the regime is NAFTA (1994 and later); both are zero otherwise.16 Note that specifying the
16As a robustness check, we vary the starting point of both CUSFTA and NAFTA in consideration of a possible
announcement e¤ect.
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regimes in this manner is consistent with CUSFTA remaining in e¤ect through the addition of
Mexico in NAFTA, where the NAFTA dummy then only represents the e¤ect of that addition, not
the e¤ect of the entire three-country FTA.
dh1   dh4 are dichotomous variables, one for each of four host-source types. Let dh1 equal one
if the U.S. hosts Canadian FDI. Let dh2 equal one if Mexico is the host country to Canadian FDI.
Let dh3 equal one if Canada is the host country to FDI from the U.S., and nally, let dh4 equal
one if Canada is the host to FDI from any non-NAFTA country. We add this last host-source type
-even though it is not formally treated in our theoretical model- for completeness, so that we cover
all FDI relationships involving Canada. We would expect a negative e¤ect of both CUSFTA and
NAFTA on this FDI as the agreements make the U.S. (due to lowered trade costs for exporting to
Canada) and Mexico (due to the lower trade and investment costs) more attractive locations for
non-North American rms.
The estimated impact of CUSFTA and NAFTA, respectively, for a particular host-source re-
lationship is then given by the kls, the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimators. Since there are four
such relationships and two regimes to consider, there are a total of eight coe¢ cients. For example,
11 gives the di¤erence-in-di¤erences e¤ect of CUSFTA on Canadian FDI in the U.S.; 22 gives the
e¤ect of NAFTA on Canadian FDI in Mexico.
In order to see why the s are of central interest, note that  is the baseline e¤ect for observations
that are pre-CUSFTA and NAFTA (dr1 = dr2 = 0) and are not of a (future) NAFTA host (dhl = 0
8 l). Then, + k is the e¤ect of CUSFTA/NAFTA on non-NAFTA hosts. The simple di¤erence,
i.e. the CUSFTA-or NAFTA-e¤ectis therefore given by 1 and 2, respectively. For host type
l, the pre- and post-NAFTA e¤ects (and similarly for CUSFTA only) on FDI are given by + l and
+ 2+ l + 2l, respectively, with the di¤erence, the NAFTA-e¤ect, being 2+ 2l. Hence, the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate is given by 2l. While the signs, magnitudes and signicance levels
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of the kls are going to be of central interest, we will also report the simple di¤erence results.17
By employing a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator, the e¤ects of CUSFTA and NAFTA on FDI
that we identify here are relative to changes in FDI that have occurred in non-NAFTA countries,
the control group. It is desirable that the control group exhibit similar characteristics along several
dimensions as the treatedgroup. However, this is not possible when the treated group is a very
small and specic set of countries and in particular when it includes the U.S., which is clearly
unique, for example with respect to GDP. We therefore condition FDI on a wide set of other
variables taken from the literature on the determinants of FDI. These controls then represent
heterogeneity in outcome dynamcis among countries (Abadie 2005). Then, rather than assuming
that FDI in Canada would have evolved similarly to FDI in a country outside of North America
without CUSFTA and NAFTA, we only need the weaker assumption that this evolution would
have been similar conditional on all other determinants of FDI.
Still, in order to further raise condence in the robustness of the results, we also specify several
control groups. As a baseline, we use all bilateral FDI that does not include any of the three North
American countries as a host. Then, we exclude all FDI elsewhere in the world that originates in
Canada or the U.S.18 Next, we further limit the control group to developed economies as these tend
to be more similar to the treatment group.19
For other control variables to include in the empirical model, we appeal to the standard FDI
17We deal with inward U.S. and inward Mexican FDI other than from Canada in the same manner as described
above, by including appropriate dichotomous variables, but in the interest of clutter and as we have explored these
issues in more depth in our companion paper (Tekin-Koru and Waldkirch, 2010), we omit the associated coe¢ cients
from our presentation of the results below.
18Hejazi and Pauly (2005) analyze the e¤ect of NAFTA on U.S. FDI in Canada in a sample of outward U.S. FDI
only. In their analysis of inward FDI, using bilateral OECD data, they do not control explicitly for the U.S. , but
only include a North America dummy and no interactions of that dummy with NAFTA or CUSFTA dummies.
19We discuss additional issues with the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach and how we deal with them in the next
section.
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literature and use a parsimonious model with the following controls:
FDI = f
0BB@ GDP Host;GDP Source; Skill Host; Skill Source;Real Exchange Rate,
Host Openness; Source Openness;Distance; ties; language; contiguity
1CCA (8)
The coe¢ cients on the rst two terms, GDP Host and GDP Source, are expected to be positive
as larger market size of both the sending and the receiving country positively a¤ect the scale of
foreign production. The next two terms, Skill Host and Skill Source, which are dened as the
share of skilled workers in the economy, proxy for a countrys endowments with skilled labor. The
literature suggests that countries better endowed with skilled labor are more likely to be headquarter
countries of multinational rms, but since even for relatively unskilled labor intensive production
processes some skilled labor is needed and we observe most FDI between similar countries, the
coe¢ cients on both skill variables are expected to be positive (Carr et al., 2001; Markusen and
Maskus, 2002). The real exchange rate, measured as an index, has been found to matter by
some studies on the determinants of FDI (Froot and Stein, 1991; Blonigen, 1997; Goldberg and
Klein, 1997), although its sign can be ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher real exchange rate
of a potential source country makes investment abroad (in foreign currency) less costly. On the
other hand, revenue received in foreign currency is worth less in home currency, which investors
presumably want at some point. If the former dominates, a positive sign is expected, if the latter,
a negative one.
Source country and host country openness are measured by the KOF economic index of global-
ization, which is based on several measures, including trade, tari¤s, hidden import barriers, trade
taxes and others (Dreher, Gaston and Martens, 2008). The sign on host country openness may be
positive or negative. A negative sign would be consistent with the tari¤-jumping argument whereby
greater openness reduces the incentive to produce abroad. A positive sign is consistent with ver-
tical integration as lower trade costs increase the incentive to ship intermediate goods abroad for
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nal assembly taking place there. As source country openness decreases the cost of shipping ei-
ther intermediates or nal goods back home, a positive sign is expected. Distance is a complex
measure taken from Centre dEtudes Prospectives et dInformations Internationales (CEPII) which
uses domestic and international distance weighted by the population concentration in important
cities within a country. Its sign is theoretically ambiguous since it can proxy for both trade and
investment costs. It is included since it usually performs well in gravity-type models. Finally, we
include a set of variables that are typically added in gravity equations as they provide additional
explanatory power. These are indicators of common language, colonial ties, and contiguity.
We should note that we do not claim that the e¤ects that we nd can solely be ascribed to
CUSFTA or NAFTA as we have limited ways of controlling for other events during the time period
that we are looking which may a¤ect the pattern of FDI. One example is Mexico joining the OECD
in 1994, the same year that NAFTA took e¤ect, though it seems unlikely that this step would have
much of an e¤ect given that no signicant policy changes were associated with this move. Another
example is the peso crisis in late 1994, early 1995. However, its main e¤ect was a steep real
depreciation of the peso and a fall in GDP, followed by a real appreciation in the years afterwards.
Our GDP and exchange controls do attempt to control for that, though one should keep in mind
that they may be limited in their ability to control for the extent of the crisis and its e¤ect on
foreign investors. However, by employing a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator, we do control for
the worldwide rising trend in FDI over the sample period, whatever its cause.
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5 Econometric Considerations and Data
5.1 Econometric Considerations
The data are in panel form and preliminary tests indicated that both autocorrelation and het-
eroscedasticity were present. Therefore, we use a panel data model (Prais-Winsten regression) with
panel corrected standard errors. We report results from regressions where the autocorrelation coef-
cient is assumed to be di¤erent for each observational unit (country pair). The variance-covariance
matrix is computed under the assumption that the disturbances are heteroscedastic and contempo-
raneously correlated across units, where each pair of cross-sectional units has their own covariance.
For each element in the covariance matrix, all available observations that are common to the two
units contributing to the covariance are used to compute it, given that the panel is unbalanced.
We have an unbalanced panel because not all data are available for all years of the sample
period. We apply the following rules. Since we are primarily interested in the e¤ects of CUSFTA
and NAFTA, we need a su¢ ciently long time series. In our base specication, we choose a minimum
of 14 observations for each country pair. In order to implement the correction for autocorrelation,
no gaps in the data are allowed. Hence, when there is a gap, we limit ourselves to using post-gap
information. In other words, if 1983 is available, 1984 is missing, and 1985 onwards is available,
the data for this country-pair start in 1985. One of the robustness checks uses a larger number of
observations, although a minimum of ve must still be imposed in order to allow for the computation
of the autocorrelation coe¢ cients for all country pairs.
Bertrand, Duo and Mullainathan (2004) point out that ignoring serial correlation in di¤erence-
in-di¤erences estimation can lead to severely biased standard errors. This should be clear as the
independent variable of interest, namely the policy change, is itself very serially correlated. While
we account for the problem by estimating a rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient, we also use one
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of the techniques they suggest which works well for samples of more than 20 observational units
(we have at least 178 country pairs). It requires estimating standard errors while allowing for an
arbitrary covariance structure between time periods, using a generalized White-like formula. This
estimator of the variance-covariance matrix is consistent as the number of country pairs tends to
innity and imposes no restrictions on the possible serial correlation of error terms. Note, however,
that this procedure has problems as well. It tends to work well for short time periods, but tends
to blow up standard errors excessively for longer time periods such as our 22 year panel.20
5.2 Data
FDI data come from three sources. U.S. inward and outward FDI data come from the standard
source used in most studies of U.S. FDI, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data
are described in detail elsewhere. Mexican FDI data come from the Mexican National Statistical
Institute (INEGI). These are FDI stocks in Mexico from 1980 on, published in U.S. dollars. The
data distinguish ten source countries throughout the sample period. They account for about 90
percent of total FDI in Mexico. Since 1994, more source country and especially industry detail is
available, but since we need su¢ cient pre-1994 data, we cannot use the additional detail in this
study. No industry or additional source country detail is available retroactively for the time before
NAFTA. The third data source, used for all other countries, including Canadian FDI in countries
other than the U.S. and Mexico, is the OECDs International Direct Investment Statistics, which
publishes FDI data in U.S. dollars. In the empirical analysis, all nominal values are converted to
real dollars using the U.S. producer price index for capital equipment.21
20Donald and Lang (2007), Hansen (2007) and Abadie et al. (2007) consider additional sources of uncertainty,
besides sampling error. However, implementation of their approaches is either not feasible or beyond the scope of
this paper.
21FDI among many OECD countries is often available twice as both an OECD source and an OECD host country
report their inward and outward FDI. Inspection of such cases reveals that the numbers do not match. For the results
reported below, we pick the numbers reported by the host country, but note that the results are largely robust to
picking source country FDI instead.
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For most of the countries in the sample, FDI rose modestly during the 1980s and rose much more
substantially during the 1990s. Within North America, the United States is the most important
host country of Canadian FDI and the most important source of both Canadian and Mexican
inward FDI. Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of real Canadian inward and outward (in the U.S.
and Mexico) FDI. Note the di¤erent scale for Mexico (on the right), illustrating that the magnitude
of FDI in Mexico is dwarfed by FDI in the U.S.
Control variable data also come from standard sources. We use PPP-adjusted GDP data from
the Penn World Tables (6.2). An important control variable in many studies is skill. The two most
common sources of skill data are the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Barro/Lee
data on schooling. We use both in our analysis to ensure the robustness of our results. The ILO
data measure the number of workers in a particular occupation and characterize some as skilled,
some as unskilled, employing the skill denitions from Carr et al. (2001). A countrys skill level
then is represented by the share of skilled workers. We ll in missing data using a linear trend
between non-missing years. For just a few countries, additional years are lled in using the growth
rate of the skilled labor share between non-missing years. Alternatively, we use the Barro/Lee data
on years of schooling. These are available only in ve-year intervals, though for a larger number of
countries than the ILO data, and we ll in missing values using a linear trend as well.22 Distance
in kilometers is a complex measure taken from Centre dEtudes Prospectives et dInformations
Internationales (CEPII) which uses domestic and international distance weighted by the population
concentration in important cities within a country. However, the measure is highly correlated with
simpler distance measures and results are not a¤ected by the choice of distance.
Table 3 contains summary statistics for our basic sample with a minimum of 14 observations
per country pair as well as for the larger sample where only a minimum of ve observations are
22Filling in missing values with repeated values from prior or future years does not change the results.
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required. It is of note that mean FDI far exceeds median FDI, indicating that it is skewed towards
a smaller number of countries. Host countries tend to be larger than source countries, but the latter
have a higher share of skilled labor than the former. Note that expanding the sample lowers average
FDI and GDP, but substantially raises openness and the real exchange rate. Since the additional
countries are small, they tend to have higher degrees of openness, as is typical when measured by
the share of trade in GDP. Moreover, their currencies tend to depreciate signicantly over time.
6 Results
Tables 4 - 11 report the results. Tables 4 (using ILO skill data), 6 (using Barro/Lee education data),
8 (using di¤erent control groups) and 10 (with trade as the dependent variable) show regression
results for the control variables and some of the coe¢ cients on the dichotomous variables, for a
variety of specications. Tables 5, 7, 9 and 11 present the simple di¤erence and the di¤erence-in-
di¤erences estimation results, which are of central interest.
The basic sample contains only source-host country pairs for which we have at least 14 observa-
tions. Specication (3) in Table 4 includes country pairs with fewer observations, which increases
the sample size from 3,294 to 6,606 observations. However, many of the newly included country pairs
still have twelve or 13 observations. Specication (4) accounts for a possible announcement e¤ect
by starting the CUSFTA and NAFTA regime dummies in 1987 and 1992, respectively, rather than
1989 or 1994.23 Specication (5) computes an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix as suggested by
Bertrand et al. (2004) as a di¤erent way to address potential bias in the di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimation and specication (6) includes both host and source country xed e¤ects.
The rst specication is one that only includes the dichotomous variables needed for the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation without any controls. The signicantly positive and large co-
23Dating the announcement e¤ect to 1988 and 1993 makes little di¤erence to the results.
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e¢ cients on both dummies indicating U.S. FDI in Canada (1) and Canadian FDI in the U.S.
(3) illustrate that even before NAFTA and CUSFTA, bilateral FDI between these countries was
unusually high. Interestingly, however, this result only holds up for inward Canadian FDI from the
U.S., not Canadian FDI in the U.S., once we include additional controls in column (2), and that
is also robust across the other specications in the table. Almost all control variables are highly
statistically signicant and have the expected signs. Market size, both of the host (GDP Host) and
the source (GDP Source), has a positive e¤ect on FDI, as does the share of skilled workers in the
economy (Skill Host and Skill Source). This illustrates that multinationals from large countries
with abundant skilled labor tend to dominate. The real exchange rate is not signicantly di¤erent
from zero in any specication except marginally in the xed e¤ects regression, indicating that it
does not tend to a¤ect FDI at such an aggregate level. Host and source country openness are at
best marginally statistically signicant, though this improves when we use the Barro/Lee skill data
later on. Finally, distance is a deterrent of FDI, as expected.
Table 5 shows the results of the e¤ects of CUSFTA and NAFTA, both in absolute terms and
relative to the evolution of FDI elsewhere in the world (the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator).
Recall that the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient is the one on the interaction term of host type
and CUSFTA or NAFTA indicator (the s). The simple di¤erence is the sum of that coe¢ cient and
the one on the CUSFTA or NAFTA indicator alone (1=2+). F-tests are used to check for the joint
signicance. The order of host type results follows the order of the hypotheses from the theoretical
section, with the addition of non-NAFTA countries FDI in Canada. Note that the statistical
signicance of the results with respect to a particular host type and regime is very robust across
specications. This is also true for the simple di¤erence and the di¤erence-in-di¤erences results.
However, the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients, which represent millions of dollars since the estimation
is in levels, do di¤er somewhat and we put these di¤erences in perspective below.
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Recall that the theory predicts that the fall in trade costs due to CUSFTA should lower intra-
agreement FDI as well as Canadian FDI in Mexico. However, only Canadian FDI in Mexico
(MexhostCan) is shown to be signicantly negatively a¤ected, though consistently so across spec-
ications. Intra-CUSFTA FDI (CanhostUS) is only marginally signicant in specication (5),
though with an unexpected positive sign. Thus, we can conrm one of the three hypotheses for
CUSFTA only.
The e¤ect of the agreement on other countriesFDI in Canada (CanhostOther) is strongly
negative and very robust across specications. This suggests that with easier access to the Canadian
market from the U.S., FDI may have been re-oriented to the U.S., with its far larger market.
With respect to the addition of Mexico to the existing CUSFTA agreement (NAFTA), the
theory predicts a positive e¤ect for intra-agreement FDI among all countries. The results are
mixed, however. Canadian FDI in the U.S. as well as U.S. FDI in Canada have positive coe¢ cients
across all specications, but they are only marginally signicant in a few of the Prais-Winsten
regressions, although strongly signicant, and much larger, when we compute an arbitrary VCE
instead. Thus, there is evidence that lower investment costs expanded FDI generally as they make
foreign engagement more attractive and that this e¤ect dominates the reduced incentive for tari¤-
jumping.
In order to get a sense of the total economic e¤ect, we can relate the estimated e¤ect of both
CUSFTA and NAFTA to the level of FDI reached by the end of our sample period (2002). For
U.S. FDI in Canada, the range is from about 20 to 30 percent, a considerable e¤ect. That is, the
model suggests that 20 to 30 percent of the 2002 FDI stock has resulted from the two agreements.24
For Canadian FDI in the U.S., the e¤ect is even larger, ranging from 28.6 to nearly 40 percent,
24Note that the model appears to be doing well in predicting FDI. The correlation between actual and predicted
FDI stocks is in the neighborhood of 0.55, statistically signicant at the one percent level. Blonigen and Davies
(2004) nd that in their data, the residuals are unreasonably large and di¤er systematically between rich and poor
countries. Our residuals appear to be of reasonable size and do not di¤er in any systematic way.
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depending on specication. We caution, however, that while all coe¢ cients are positive, statistical
signicance is not always achieved.
The negative impact on Canadian FDI in Mexico found under CUSFTA only is conrmed for
NAFTA to some extent, though note that only two of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences results that
includes control variables is statistically signicant. Still, the result is somewhat puzzling as it
is not only contrary to theoretical expectations, but also in stark contrast to the evolution of the
absolute amount of FDI, which rose substantially after 1994. However, if we compare its magnitude
to that of, for example, Canadian FDI in the U.S., it is much smaller. The estimated e¤ect is also
unreasonably large in magnitude, on the order of more than 90 up to over 200 percent of 2002 FDI.
As did CUSFTA, NAFTA is robustly shown to have had a negative e¤ect on other countriesFDI
in Canada, which is statistically signicant in every specication. Putting the estimated coe¢ cients
in relation to 2002 FDI, the agreements resulted in a 10 to over 22 percent lower amount. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that for other countries, access to the Canadian market from either
the U.S. or Mexico has been greatly facilitated with the lower trade costs, provided rules of origin
are satised. The additional reduction in investment costs in Mexico in particular reinforces this
investment diversion away from Canada.25
Despite some di¤erences in the magnitude of the estimated e¤ects, the qualitative results are
similar across our di¤erent specications except in the NAFTA cases for bilateral Canadian-U.S.
FDI when we allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix, where the coe¢ cients are much
larger. Even though this method worked well for Bertrand et al.s (2004) data, it may not be the
case here. For example, consider the average estimated autocorrelation in regressions (1) through
(4). It is about 0.85, much higher than in Bertrand et al.s data, where the true autocorrelation
is comparable to our estimated one in magnitude. Moreover, they do not allow for individual (in
25 In contrast, Hejazi and Pauly (2005) nd a negative e¤ect of NAFTA on U.S. FDI in Canada and no e¤ect
(see the statistically insignicant coe¢ cients for Canada) for other countriesFDI in Canada. However, as discussed
above, due to their di¤erences in methodology and sample, their results are not strictly comparable to ours.
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our case: country-pair specic) autocorrelation coe¢ cients, but impose a common one. Thus, we
maintain that our Prais-Winsten methodology is appropriate and yields good results.
Our rst important robustness check is re-estimating the model using the Barro/Lee education
data rather than the ILO skill data. Results are presented in Tables 6 and 7, which contain the
same specications as Tables 4 and 5, without the no controls one of course. The signs and
signicance levels of most control variables are virtually the same, including the coe¢ cients on the
Barro/Lee education measures. An exception are host and source country openness, which are now
statistically signicant in most regressions. The positive coe¢ cients are consistent with a vertical
integration motive for FDI. Turning to the CUSFTA and NAFTA e¤ects, we note that virtually
all results hold up qualitatively. There are some di¤erences in the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients,
though they do not appear to systematically di¤er in one direction or the other and not by much.
Our second important robustness check changes the identity of the control group. As discussed
earlier, there is no obvious control group of countries that are similar to the CUSFTA/NAFTA
countries in all respects but becoming part of an integration agreement. Therefore, we use a variety
of control groups to check whether the results hinge on this choice and present the results in Tables
8 and 9. We repeat the basic exercise for three out of our six specications, but note that results
for the others are comparable. Almost none of the results concerning the e¤ects of CUSFTA and
NAFTA are sensitive to the identity of the control group. The only exception concerns U.S. FDI
in Canada, whose coe¢ cient is now signicantly negative in all of the xed e¤ects specications.
For CUSFTA, this is consistent with theoretical expectations. For NAFTA, it is not.
Finally, we repeat our exercise with trade as the dependent variable rather than FDI. Consistent
with theoretical expectations, we nd that both CUSFTA and NAFTA had a positive e¤ect on trade
between the U.S. and Canada. This represents the e¤ect from increased vertical integration in the
region as well as a traditional trade creation e¤ect. For Canada-Mexico trade as well as Canadian
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trade with other countries, the results are mixed. This reects the fact that there is simply little
economic interaction between the two small countries in North America as well as a possible trade
diversion e¤ect.
In summary, we nd that there is ample evidence that North American economic integration
rst with CUSFTA and then including Mexico in NAFTA has a¤ected FDI both in and from
Canada, the small Northern country in the agreements. The e¤ect is positive for intra-NAFTA
FDI except that Canadian FDI in Mexico is negatively a¤ected. Although other countriesFDI in
Canada has also fallen relative to general trends and what is to be expected from the evolution of
the traditional determinants of FDI, the results suggest that economic integration with low-cost
countries need not strictly divert FDI away from a small higher-cost member country.
7 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the e¤ect of North American integration on Canadian foreign direct
investment (FDI), both inward and outward. The empirical results suggest that CUSFTA alone
did not have a positive e¤ect, perhaps because it was quickly followed by the inclusion of Mexico
into NAFTA. The larger agreement is found to have had a positive e¤ect on Canadian FDI in the
U.S. and Canadian inward FDI from the U.S., though a negative e¤ect on other countriesFDI in
Canada and Canadian FDI in Mexico. The results are consistent with a theory of trade agreements
lowering not just trade, but investment costs, which results in greater foreign engagement of some
rms, su¢ cient to generate a positive e¤ect in aggregate data.
To our knowledge, this is the rst paper that combines U.S., Mexican and bilateral OECD FDI
data to analyze the e¤ect of NAFTA on Canada. Together with the results from our companion
paper, which found substantial increases in the wake of NAFTA of U.S. FDI in Mexico and no
positive e¤ect on non-NAFTA FDI in either the U.S. or Mexico, we obtain a comprehensive picture
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of how North American integration with its coincident reduction in investment costs a¤ects FDI in
the region. Clearly, it encourages intra-regional FDI, although to the detriment of third-country
FDI.
The results are robust to di¤erent econometric specications, the nature of the data and the
sample, the inclusion of country xed e¤ects as well as the identity of the control group. More
importantly, while we cannot claim to cleanly isolate a CUSFTA or NAFTA e¤ect given that
it is impossible to control for all other events that occur during this time period, the nature
of a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation and an attempt to control for all commonly recognized
determinants of FDI make us condent about the robustness of the results.
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Note: C(pm; pa)  c(pm; pa)=(1 ) and TH = (tH)=(1 ) and TL = (tL)=(1 ) are transformed
measures of the unit and trade costs, respectively.
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Table 2: Hypotheses
CUSFTA Regime NAFTA Regime
Canadian FDI in the U.S. Decreases Increases
Canadian FDI in Mexico Decreases Increases
U.S. FDI in Canada Decreases Increases
Table 3: Summary Statistics
14+ observations 5+ observations
Regressor Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D.
FDI (000 $) 7,856 986.0 22,262 4,132 247.0 15,515
GDP Host (mill. $) 2,064 626.2 2,892 1,336 366.5 2,392
GDP Source (mill. $) 1,579 642.7 2,388 1,152 308.1 2,140
Skill Host - ILO (share) 0.258 0.285 0.102 0.261 0.285 0.103
Skill Source - ILO (share) 0.280 0.298 0.096 0.287 0.306 0.101
Skill Host - Barro/Lee (years) 8.384 8.483 2.635 8.333 8.684 2.577
Skill Source - Barro/Lee (years) 8.795 9.007 2.265 8.289 8.706 2.615
Real Exchange Rate (index) 99.64 99.01 35.14 126.9 100.0 897.9
Host Openness (%) 59.70 44.22 60.73 72.07 59.02 64.18
Source Openness (%) 60.20 50.58 50.59 73.27 62.22 58.23
Distance (km) 7,205 6,855 4,705 7,088 6,923 4,888
CUSFTA 0.268 0 0.443 0.197 0 0.398
NAFTA 0.469 0 0.499 0.676 1 0.468
UShostCan 0.007 0 0.083 0.003 0 0.056
MexhostCan 0.007 0 0.083 0.003 0 0.056
CanhostUS 0.006 0 0.079 0.003 0 0.053
CanhostOther 0.061 0 0.239 0.040 0 0.196
Notes:
CUSFTA and NAFTA are indicator variables for the CUSFTA only (1989-93) and NAFTA
(1994 on) time periods.
UShostCan, MexhostCan, CanhostUS and CanhostOther are indicator variables for the four
host types discussed in the text, where Can = Canada, US = United States, Mex = Mexico and
other = countries other than Mexico and the United States.
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Table 4: Regression Results: ILO Skill Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regressor No 14+ 5+ Announce- Arbitrary Country
Controls obs. obs. ment E¤ect VCE FE
GDP Host 4.976*** 5.868*** 4.738*** 6.150*** 4.829***
(1.139) (0.623) (1.111) (1.774) (0.985)
GDP Source 5.021*** 2.898*** 4.932*** 2.637*** 4.562***
(0.613) (0.346) (0.603) (0.751) (0.550)
Skill Host 46,397*** 17,490*** 44,747*** 14,528 49,896**
(11,745) (3,265) (11,127) (10,083) (20,252)
Skill Source 32,124*** 14,548*** 32,088*** 39,392** 7,294
(9,438) (3,479) (9,447) (13,923) (11,202)
Real Exchange Rate -0.218 -0.011 0.887 -24.14 -8.210*
(4.419) (0.020) (4.568) (15.43) (4.264)
Host Openness 5.083 56.02* -4.322 76.43 -64.96
(65.29) (28.83) (66.80) (57.91) (65.12)
Source Openness 42.86 17.71 40.39 -72.70 -133.1*
(47.68) (19.36) (48.38) (96.18) (71.36)
Distance -1.146*** -0.355*** -1.171*** -0.419 -1.026***
(0.258) (0.079) (0.260) (0.266) (0.228)
CUSFTA (1) -1,147 -780.0 -197.9 -669.3 -1,817* -595.6
(989.6) (1,108) (918.9) (1,318) (1,019) (1,112)
NAFTA (2) -694.4 -837.7 -463.2 -672.8 -2,288** -205.3
(991.5) (1,112) (542.7) (1,118) (1,125) (1,095)
UShostCan ( 1) 28,372*** -261.6 -6,618 1,715 -10,290 12,398
(7,419) (10,043) (7,795) (11,252) (9,117) (11,049)
MexhostCan ( 2) -573.0 4,715*** 1,933 4,375** 3,249 18,938***
(1,446) (1,687) (1,216) (1,793) (2,202) (4,243)
CanhostUS ( 3) 68,042*** 39,467** 49,438*** 40,043*** 47,324*** 52,521***
(7,408) (6,644) (6,780) (8,013) (4,617) (9,666)
CanhostOther ( 4) -3,165** 827.9 -1,089 762.9 1,633 6,388
(1,476) (1,950) (1,303) (2,178) (1,975) (6,745)
Number of obs. 3,294 3,294 6,606 3,294 3,294 3,294
R2 0.21 0.34 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.47
Average autocorr. 0.872 0.837 0.850 0.837 N/A 0.818
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant, a time trend, dummies for colonial ties, common
language and contiguity as well as dummies for non-NAFTA country FDI in the U.S. and Mexico and
U.S. FDI in Mexico as well as the their interactions with CUSFTA and NAFTA dummies (not reported).
The -coe¢ cients (the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimators) are reported in Table 5, along with the
simple di¤erence results.
Regressions (1)-(4) correct for rst-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coe¢ cients are
estimated separately for each country pair. Covariances vary across country pairs. See the text
for details. Regression (5) computes an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix. Regression (6)
includes host and source country xed e¤ects (coe¢ cients not reported).
All regressions except (3) contain at least 14 observations for each country pair.
In Regression (4), the CUSFTA and NAFTA dummies are set equal to one starting in 1987 and 1992
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Table 5: CUSFTA and NAFTA E¤ects, ILO Skill Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No 14+ 5+ Announce- Arbitrary Country
Controls obs. obs. ment E¤ect VCE FE
CUSFTA
Simple Di¤erence 11,021 6,368 7,803 7,326 1,424 6,863
UShostCan (1 + 11) (7,932) (7,010) (7,026) (7,136) (3,282) (7,050)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 12,168 7,148 8,001 7,995 3,241 7,459
UShostCan ( 11) (8,013) (7,087) (6,835) (7,407) (3,001) (6,973)
Simple Di¤erence -5,913*** -5,386*** -2,509*** -4,384*** -7,211*** -5,063***
MexhostCan (1 + 12) (1,504) (1,317) (667.7) (1,258) (2,024) (1,519)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -4,767*** -4,606*** -2,311** -3,715** -5,395*** -4,467**
MexhostCan ( 12) (1,525) (1,416) (947.7) (1,548) (1,381) (1,770)
Simple Di¤erence 11,344 4,600 9,546 8,896 4,545** 3,956
CanhostUS (1 + 13) (7,810) (7,327) (7,982) (7,510) (1,847) (7,421)
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences 11,347 5,380 9,744 9,566 6,362** 4,551
CanhostUS ( 13) (7,809) (6,965) (7,449) (7,314) (1,734) (7,038)
Simple Di¤erence -4,026*** -4,654*** -1,942*** -3,625** -4,189** -4,695***
CanhostOther (1 + 14) (1,422) (1,329) (632.6) (1,428) (1,749) (1,583)
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences -2,917* -3,874*** -1,745 -2,956* -2,372* -4,099***
CanhostOther ( 14) (1,556) (1,409) (1,149) (1,523) (1,412) (1,548)
NAFTA
Simple di¤erence 13,149* 9,187 9,669 5,636 21,686*** 9,222
UShostCan (2 + 21) (7,932) (7,027) (6,998) (7,048) (3,464) (7,026)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 13,844* 10,025 10,133 6,309 23,975*** 9,427
UShostCan ( 21) (8,017) (7,105) (7,157) (7,175) (3,369) (6,921)
Simple di¤erence -4,371*** -3,010** -672.4 -3,803*** -1,946 -3,606**
MexhostCan (2 + 22) (1,537) (1,296) (653.0) (1,416) (1,292) (1,517)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -3,677** -2,172 -209.2 -3,130** 342.1 -3,400**
MexhostCan ( 22) (1,566) (1,418) (653.9) (1,490) (874.4) (1,731)
Simple di¤erence 13,149* 9,242 12,966* 2,641 21,497*** 9,092
CanhostUS (2 + 23) (7,874) (7,163) (7,723) (7,173) (1,815) (7,138)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 13,844* 10,080 13,429* 3,314 23,786*** 9,297
CanhostUS ( 23) (7,600) (6,750) (7,616) (6,812) (1,630) (6,681)
Simple di¤erence -5,374*** -3,485*** -1,853*** -3,401** -5,811*** -2,636**
CanhostOther (2 + 24) (1,520) (1,164) (607.0) (1,357) (1,489) (1,178)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -4,680*** -2,648** -1,390** -2,728** -3,523*** -2,430**
CanhostOther ( 24) (1,617) (1,238) (621.1) (1,354) (1,000) (1,165)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Results derived from the regressions in Table 4.
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Table 6: Regression Results: Barro/Lee Education Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regressor 14+ 5+ Announce- Arbitrary Country
obs. obs. ment E¤ect VCE FE
GDP Host 4.835*** 4.816*** 4.616*** 5.544*** 3.309***
(0.915) (0.453) (0.867) (1.320) (1.123)
GDP Source 4.376*** 2.299*** 4.339*** 2.662*** 4.365***
(0.531) (0.274) (0.522) (0.657) (0.589)
Skill Host (Barro/Lee) 1,785*** 816.6*** 1,754*** 270.9 -3,967***
(485.3) (146.4) (460.5) (324.0) (895.6)
Skill Source (Barro/Lee) 1,141*** 381.0*** 1,166*** 755.1** 1,110
(292.4) (89.03) (289.5) (380.9) (684.4)
Real Exchange Rate -3.177 0.007 -1.940 -24.75* -5.461
(3.380) (0.011) (3.511) (13.36) (3.878)
Host Openness 98.06* 90.47*** 91.03* 113.9*** -116.9**
(54.72) (20.84) (53.28) (42.92) (58.05)
Source Openness 123.7*** 70.20*** 120.5*** 101.3 -5.370
(43.35) (20.24) (43.99) (74.30) (39.37)
Distance -0.969*** -0.403*** -0.972*** -0.410** -1.005***
(0.240) (0.079) (0.241) (0.166) (0.190)
CUSFTA (1) -716.3 -329.8 -597.6 -1,843** -557.6
(1,042) (871.0) (1,205) (801.2) (875.2)
NAFTA (2) -496.3 -400.2 -401.8 -1,918** 20.07
(984.3) (501.9) (990.8) (845.1) (811.1)
UShostCan ( 1) -7,413 -6,527 -4,968 -10,878 70,298***
(9,224) (7,442) (10,553) (7,177) (18,436)
MexhostCan ( 2) 1,567 1,174 1,830 -465.7 31,568***
(1,381) (1,105) (1,508) (1,509) (7,660)
CanhostUS ( 3) 36,164*** 48,026*** 37,270*** 44,952*** 104,524***
(6,847) (6,879) (8,279) (4,518) (13,027)
CanhostOther ( 4) -6,367** -3,249** -5,970** 80.39 63,263***
(2,688) (1,441) (2,695) (1,867) (12,359)
Number of obs. 4,419 9,379 4,419 4,419 4,419
R2 0.33 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.45
Average autocorr. 0.841 0.856 0.841 N/A 0.829
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant, a time trend, dummies for colonial ties, common
language and contiguity as well as dummies for non-NAFTA country FDI in the U.S. and Mexico and
U.S. FDI in Mexico as well as the their interactions with CUSFTA and NAFTA dummies (not reported).
The -coe¢ cients (the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimators) are reported in Table 7, along with the
simple di¤erence results.
Regressions (1)-(3) correct for rst-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coe¢ cients are
estimated separately for each country pair. Covariances vary across country pairs. See the text
for details. Regression (4) computes an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix. Regression (5)
includes host and source country xed e¤ects (coe¢ cients not reported).
All regressions except (2) contain at least 14 observations for each country pair.
In Regression (3), the CUSFTA and NAFTA dummies are set equal to one starting in 1987 and 1992.
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Table 7: CUSFTA and NAFTA E¤ects, Barro/Lee Education Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
14+ 5+ Announce- Arbitrary Country
obs. obs. ment E¤ect VCE FE
CUSFTA
Simple Di¤erence 8,717 9,931 8,088 6,412*** 7,622
UShostCan (1 + 11) (6,945) (7,281) (7,098) (1,921) (7,085)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 9,434 10,261 8,686 8,255*** 8,179
UShostCan ( 11) (7,127) (7,168) (7,438) (1,795) (7,105)
Simple Di¤erence -5,375*** -2,379*** -4,641*** -3,550*** -1,837*
MexhostCan (1 + 12) (1,356) (713.3) (1,245) (1,068) (1,020)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -4,658*** -2,049** -4,044*** -1,707* -1,280
MexhostCan ( 12) (1,404) (916.8) (1,439) (881.6) (1,194)
Simple Di¤erence 7,948 11,203 9,989 6,240*** 6,287
CanhostUS (1 + 13) (7,316) (8,100) (7,628) (1,143) (7,112)
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences 8,664 11,533 10,587 8,082*** 6,845
CanhostUS ( 13) (6,977) (7,623) (7,480) (1,021) (6,851)
Simple Di¤erence -2,303* -607.3 -3,207** -2,682** -2,392*
CanhostOther (1 + 14) (1,233) (727.0) (1,342) (1,201) (1,296)
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences -1,586 -277.5 -2,609 -839.1 -1,834
CanhostOther ( 14) (1,363) (994.0) (1,631) (877.2) (1,334)
NAFTA
Simple di¤erence 9,313 10,947 6,713 21,838*** 9,052
UShostCan (2 + 21) (6,920) (7,237) (6,991) (2,935) (7,070)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 9,809 11,348 7,114 23,756*** 9,032
UShostCan ( 21) (7,178) (7,506) (7,310) (2,669) (7,132)
Simple di¤erence -3,962*** -1,006 -4,414*** -2,810** -3,028***
MexhostCan (2 + 22) (1,294) (670.4) (1,366) (1,099) (1,160)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -3,466*** -606.1 -4,012*** -891.5 -3,048**
MexhostCan ( 22) (1,312) (582.2) (1,399) (615.3) (1,354)
Simple di¤erence 9,712 13,646* 4,037 21,914*** 9,465
CanhostUS (2 + 23) (7,096) (7,836) (7,193) (1,546) (6,890)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 10,209 14,046* 4,439 23,832*** 9,445
CanhostUS ( 23) (6,800) (7,801) (6,953) (1,376) (6,637)
Simple di¤erence -3,381*** -1,210* -2,630** -4,174*** -2,282*
CanhostOther (2 + 24) (1,292) (619.3) (1,217) (1,149) (1,253)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -2,885** -809.9 -2,229* -2,256** -2,302*
CanhostOther ( 24) (1,344) (526.9) (1,274) (888.2) (1,264)
Note: Results derived from the regressions in Table 6.
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Table 8: Robustness: Regression Results for Di¤erent Control Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Alternative Control 1 Alternative Control 2
Regressor No 14+ Country No 14+ Country
Controls obs. FE Controls obs. FE
GDP Host 4.468*** 5.789*** 4.729*** 4.389***
(1.138) (1.066) (1.331) (1.169)
GDP Source 16.06*** 21.52*** 20.76*** 23.04***
(2.239) (2.631) (2.885) (2.772)
Skill Host 59,651*** 61.716** 93,974*** 69,861**
(15,992) (25,867) (27,079) (32,804)
Skill Source 21,939** 11,590 36,866** 7,978
(9,334) (12,437) (14,712) (13,943)
Real Exchange Rate 4.511 -13.85*** 14.80 -16.21***
(5.679) (4.314) (11.55) (5.972)
Host Openness 9.625 -58.89 -66.94 -78.08
(98.78) (65.24) (106.3) (100.3)
Source Openness 226.6*** -219.4*** 432.2*** -293.3***
(69.44) (72.22) (102.7) (96.04)
Distance -0.568** -0.641*** -1.122*** 1.020
(0.267) (0.169) (0.389) (1.374)
CUSFTA (1) -1,425 -1,023 -438.3 -1,521 -1,198 -420.8
(1,041) (1,250) (1,181) (1,604) (2,212) (1,895)
NAFTA (2) -1,139 -1,201 8.480 -635.9 -2,153 528.2
(1,033) (1,236) (1,144) (1,567) (2,233) (1,850)
UShostCan ( 1) 26,276*** 3,862 26,665* 28,703*** 4,042 73,083***
(7,754) (9,071) (14,961) (7,695) (9,716) (26,844)
MexhostCan ( 2) 1,854 7,211*** 37,153*** 826.8 12,768*** 76,918***
(1,324) (2,448) (7,929) (2,204) (4,363) (22,637)
CanhostUS ( 3) 66,032*** -19,212 -23,034 68,213*** -39,017*** 6,760
(7,652) (12,969) (19,990) (7,400) (14,888) (28,727)
CanhostOther ( 4) 2,100 121.1 416.0 -7.594 6,628* 29,206**
(1,322) (2,620) (7,150) (2,426) (3,431) (14,506)
Number of obs. 2,684 2,684 2,684 1,944 1,944 1,944
R2 0.25 0.39 0.58 0.25 0.45 0.59
Average autocorr. 0.691 0.634 0.375 0.694 0.528 0.381
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant, a time trend, dummies for colonial ties, common
language and contiguity as well as dummies for non-NAFTA country FDI in the U.S. and Mexico and
U.S. FDI in Mexico as well as the their interactions with CUSFTA and NAFTA dummies (not reported).
The -coe¢ cients (the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimators) are reported in Table 9, along with the
simple di¤erence results.
Regressions (1)-(3) limit the control group to bilateral FDI among countries not involving Canada,
the U.S. and Mexico as source. Regressions (4)-(6) limit the control group further to include only
developed host and source countries. See the text for more details.
See Table 4 Notes for details on specic regressions.
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Table 9: Robustness: NAFTA and CUSFTA E¤ects for Di¤erent Control Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Alternative Control 1 Alternative Control 2
No 14+ Country No 14+ Country
Controls obs. FE Controls obs. FE
CUSFTA
Simple Di¤erence 11,512 7,993 6,495 9,990 7,056 6,570
UShostCan (1 + 11) (8,002) (6,865) (6,859) (7,731) (6,633) (7,011)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 12,936 9,016 6,933 11,511 8,254 6,991
UShostCan ( 11) (8,395) (7,302) (6,989) (8,132) (7,444) (7,211)
Simple Di¤erence -5,295*** -3,725*** -4,762*** -7,197*** -3,896** -6,276***
MexhostCan (1 + 12) (1,357) (1,364) (1,568) (1,859) (1,848) (2,108)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -3,871*** -2,702* -4,323** -5,676** -2,699 -5,855**
MexhostCan ( 12) (1,357) (1,552) (1,979) (2,244) (2,291) (2,967)
Simple Di¤erence 10,640 -7,317 -17,672** 9,270 -16,447** -21,543***
CanhostUS (1 + 13) (8,154) (6,465) (6,948) (7,867) (7,273) (7,423)
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences 12,064 -6,294 -17,234*** 10,791 -15,249** -21,123***
CanhostUS ( 13) (8,082) (6,030) (6,546) (7,457) (6,571) (6,906)
Simple Di¤erence -4,163*** -4,513*** -4,107*** -5,588*** -6,743*** -5,024**
CanhostOther (1 + 14) (1,375) (1,398) (1,568) (1,854) (2,067) (1,977)
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences -2,739* -3,490*** -3,669** -4,067* -5,546*** -4,603**
CanhostOther ( 14) (1,404) (1,253) (1,606) (2,377) (2,000) (2,267)
NAFTA
Simple di¤erence 13,649* 9,323 9,324 12,095 8,268 9,840
UShostCan (2 + 21) (7,992) (6,914) (6,856) (7,731) (6,701) (7,013)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 14,789* 10,524 9,315 12,731 10,421 9,311
UShostCan ( 21) (8,397) (7,346) (6,956) (8,152) (7,544) (7,144)
Simple di¤erence -3,750*** -4,146*** -2,850* -5,666*** -5,675*** -4,749**
MexhostCan (2 + 22) (1,381) (1,497) (1,570) (1,897) (2,059) (1,982)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -2,610* -2,945* -2,858 -5,030** -3,522 -5,277**
MexhostCan ( 22) (1,336) (1,579) (1,799) (2,277) (2,334) (2,611)
Simple di¤erence 13,645* -3,792 -11,209* 12,079 -10,381 -15,254**
CanhostUS (2 + 23) (7,982) (6,409) (6,735) (7,698) (7,165) (7,120)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 14,785* -2,591 -11,217* 12,715* -8,228 -15,783**
CanhostUS ( 23) (7,882) (5,914) (6,358) (7,202) (6,296) (6,642)
Simple di¤erence -5,363*** -2,592** -1,328 -7,028*** -3,151** -1,795
CanhostOther (2 + 24) (1,430) (1,096) (906.0) (1,935) (1,503) (1,195)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -4,224*** -1,392 -1,337 -6,392*** -997.4 -2,323
CanhostOther ( 24) (1,384) (904.0) (994.2) (2,386) (1,545) (1,725)
Note: Results derived from the regressions in Table 8.
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Table 10: Regression Results for Dependent Variable Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regressor No 14+ 5+ Announce- Arbitrary Country
Controls obs. obs. ment E¤ect VCE FE
GDP Host 3.811*** 4.026*** 3.893*** 6.037*** 3.137***
(0.371) (0.247) (0.360) (1.045) (0.381)
GDP Source 1.778*** 1.170*** 1.756*** 1.418*** 2.065***
(0.134) (0.089) (0.125) (0.385) (0.202)
Skill Host 6,753*** 3,841*** 6,968*** 7,110 2,618
(1,642) (724.2) (1,541) (4,431) (2,430)
Skill Source 873.0 1,461** 1,539 13,359* 2,212
(2,024) (746.9) (2,214) (8,085) (2,340)
Real Exchange Rate -6.424*** -0.010* -5.694*** -25.67* -3.935**
(1.924) (0.005) (1.811) (13.99) (1.645)
Host Openness 13.26 31.76*** 15.21 56.02* -37.00
(11.58) (5.283) (10.76) (30.28) (28.87)
Source Openness -46.30*** -18.32*** -56.41*** -117.0* -15.82
(15.28) (6.145) (16.38) (66.71) (25.21)
Distance -0.297*** -0.136*** -0.299*** -0.286** -0.261***
(0.041) (0.011) (0.040) (0.143) (0.053)
CUSFTA (1) -552.2 -155.2 -125.4 345.4 1,405*** -197.6
(475.1) (381.3) (400.3) (445.5) (541.9) (378.6)
NAFTA (2) -131.0 102.5 -14.24 -181.4 329.5 103.1
(464.2) (383.3) (216.3) (379.7) (653.0) (382.1)
UShostCan ( 1) 65,913*** 44,501*** 46,947*** 46,365*** 29,260*** 56,559***
(8,527) (8,353) (7,659) (11,492) (6,297) (8,215)
MexhostCan ( 2) -120.6 -319.6 -728.2 27.76 34.26 9,154***
(694.3) (546.4) (471.8) (527.2) (1,620) (1,528)
CanhostUS ( 3) 54,934*** 43,579*** 50,783*** 44,463*** 40,548*** 51,372***
(6,399) (6,515) (6,024) (8,803) (3,726) (6,417)
CanhostOther ( 4) -837.0** -924.8** -1,522*** -738.9* -854.4 5,607***
(385.6) (400.1) (363.4) (408.1) (1,287) (1,399)
Number of obs. 2,970 2,970 5,572 2,970 2,970 2,970
R2 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.86 0.66 0.92
Average autocorr. 0.928 0.912 0.921 0.913 N/A 0.903
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. All regressions include a constant, a time trend, dummies for colonial ties, common
language and contiguity as well as dummies for non-NAFTA country FDI in the U.S. and Mexico and
U.S. FDI in Mexico as well as the their interactions with CUSFTA and NAFTA dummies (not reported).
The -coe¢ cients (the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimators) are reported in Table 5, along with the
simple di¤erence results.
Regressions (1)-(4) correct for rst-order autocorrelation where autocorrelation coe¢ cients are
estimated separately for each country pair. Covariances vary across country pairs. See the text
for details. Regression (5) computes an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix. Regression (6)
includes host and source country xed e¤ects (coe¢ cients not reported).
All regressions except (3) contain at least 14 observations for each country pair.
In Regression (4), the CUSFTA and NAFTA dummies are set equal to one starting in 1987 and 1992.
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Table 11: CUSFTA and NAFTA E¤ects on Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No 14+ 5+ Announce- Arbitrary Country
Controls obs. obs. ment E¤ect VCE FE
CUSFTA
Simple Di¤erence 29,477** 26,540** 26,911** 22,283* 22,127*** 26,977**
UShostCan (1 + 11) (11,596) (10,645) (10,686) (13,273) (1,725) (10,804)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 30,030** 26,696** 27,036** 21,938 20,722*** 27,174**
UShostCan ( 11) (11,827) (10,771) (10,796) (13,379) (1,753) (10,946)
Simple Di¤erence -2,349*** -1,080** -386.9 -520.8 -1,555 -1,264***
MexhostCan (1 + 12) (646.3) (422.5) (330.7) (385.3) (1,132) (463.6)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -1,797** -924.8* -261.5 -866.2 -2,960*** -1,066*
MexhostCan ( 12) (733.5) (553.5) (566.5) (571.4) (927.6) (545.8)
Simple Di¤erence 17,473** 16,627** 18,068** 16,350* 17,909*** 16,281**
CanhostUS (1 + 13) (7,833) (7,500) (7,769) (8,942) (1,847) (7,400)
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences 18,026** 16,782** 18,193** 16,004* 16,505*** 16,478**
CanhostUS ( 13) (8,040) (7,584) (7,841) (9,025) (928.3) (7,508)
Simple Di¤erence -1,714*** -647.6*** -305.3** -271.7 -354.4 -583.6**
CanhostOther (1 + 14) (471.3) (204.6) (131.9) (232.1) (787.5) (231.5)
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences -1,162*** -492.4 -180.0 -617.1 -1,759** -386.0
CanhostOther ( 14) (434.9) (365.0) (371.0) (412.8) (721.5) (369.6)
NAFTA
Simple di¤erence 55,919*** 52,720*** 52,897*** 41,536*** 57,421*** 53,121***
UShostCan (2 + 21) (11,953) (11,047) (11,068) (13,030) (1,563) (11,225)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 56,050*** 52,617*** 52,911*** 41,718*** 57,091*** 53,018***
UShostCan ( 21) (12,182) (11,177) (11,164) (13,117) (1,530) (11,364)
Simple di¤erence -1,065* 260.3 797.2** -302.0 1,379** 5.739
MexhostCan (2 + 22) (644.2) (388.5) (326.8) (400.1) (659.1) (398.0)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -934.2 157.8 811.4* -120.7 1,049*** -97.40
MexhostCan ( 22) (729.3) (520.6) (448.2) (519.8) (332.5) (499.0)
Simple di¤erence 33,642*** 32,844*** 34,009*** 23,726*** 39,676*** 32,428***
CanhostUS (2 + 23) (7,802) (7,476) (7,753) (8,550) (875.7) (7,392)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences 33,773*** 32,741*** 34,023*** 23,907*** 39,347*** 32,325***
CanhostUS ( 23) (8,018) (7,569) (7,835) (8,609) (547.5) (7,502)
Simple di¤erence -1,789*** -188.9 -140.7 -431.5* -38.27 -165.0
CanhostOther (2 + 24) (499.4) (388.5) (113.1) (229.9) (678.3) (213.0)
Di¤erence-in-di¤erences -1,658*** -291.5 -126.4 -250.2 -367.8 -268.2
CanhostOther ( 24) (457.0) (361.7) (180.6) (365.3) (510.8) (366.2)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Results derived from the regressions in Table 10.
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Figure 1: Pre-CUSFTA integration strategies
Figure 2: CUSFTA integration strategies
Figure 3: NAFTA integration strategies
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Figure 4: Canadian Inward and Outward Real FDI Stock, $millions
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